INTRODUCTION

This essay will be shorter than most of my previous essays. This is deliberate, as it addresses a specific intellectual fallacy that afflicts the minds of those who either devote little attention to critical thought or whose minds are occupied with other subjects. If you love truth—and, in this sense, are a philosopher, since philosophy is fundamentally a love of truth—you may have encountered individuals who are entirely unaware of the self-defeating nature of their own reasoning.

I do not believe that we should devote extensive time to debating with those who have no genuine intention of learning or who are unwilling to undertake even the basic intellectual effort required for logical reasoning. We believe in free will, and unfortunately, this includes the freedom to remain ignorant: to reject reason, to neglect intellectual discipline, and consequently to become susceptible to whoever speaks the loudest or is most effective at persuading the mind.

Relativism and Subjectivism as Ultimate Truth: A Self-Defeating World view

The Self-Refuting Nature of Relativism and Subjectivism

One of the most common positions expressed in discussions about religion and philosophy is that it does not matter what a person believes, provided those beliefs are not imposed on others.

According to this view, everyone is entitled to their own religion, their own conception of God, or even to no religion at all.

Conflict arises only when someone attempts to convince or compel others to adopt the same beliefs. At first glance, this appears to be a tolerant and peaceful position.

Upon closer examination, however, it rests on philosophical assumptions that undermine themselves.

The argument usually begins by claiming that no one can truly know which religion is correct. Since no one has experienced life after death, heaven, hell, or ultimate salvation, every religious belief is said to be nothing more than a personal perception or a tradition inherited from one’s parents or culture. From this premise, the conclusion is drawn that no one has the right to impose his or her beliefs on anyone else.

The difficulty is that this conclusion immediately raises an epistemological question. If every religious claim is merely a personal perspective, then on what basis can the claim that “no one should impose their beliefs on others” be regarded as universally true? Is that statement itself merely another personal perception, or is it being presented as an objective truth that everyone ought to accept?

This exposes a fundamental tension within relativism. The relativist maintains that all truth is relative to individual perspectives while simultaneously asking everyone else to accept that proposition as universally binding.

In other words, the claim that “all truth is relative” is itself presented as an absolute truth. The position therefore defeats itself.

If the principle of relativism is objectively true, then not all truth is relative. If, on the other hand, relativism is itself merely one personal opinion among many, then no one has any obligation to accept it.

A similar contradiction appears in the assertion that “nobody knows anything.” Such a statement is itself a knowledge claim. To affirm that no one possesses knowledge requires claiming to know at least one thing: namely, that nobody knows. The argument therefore collapses under its own weight. It attempts to deny the possibility of objective knowledge while simultaneously relying upon objective knowledge to make its case.

The appeal to peace also suffers from a similar problem. Peace is often presented as a self-evident moral ideal that everyone ought to pursue. Yet if no objective moral or epistemological foundation has first been established, why should peace be preferred over conflict? If morality is entirely subjective, another individual could consistently maintain that domination, conquest, or violence is preferable to peace. One person could even claim that his religion commands him to wage war against those who disagree with him. Within a purely relativistic framework, there is no objective standard by which such beliefs could be condemned as genuinely wrong rather than merely unpopular.

Appealing to the opinion of the majority does not resolve this difficulty. Even if most people happen to value peace, the popularity of an idea says nothing about its truth. Consensus does not create objective morality. To argue that peace is good simply because most people approve of it commits an appeal to the majority, confusing widespread agreement with objective justification.

The deeper problem is that concepts such as peace, tolerance, and freedom cannot simply be assumed. They require a philosophical foundation capable of explaining why they are objectively good and why every individual ought to respect them. Without such a foundation, these values become arbitrary preferences rather than universal moral obligations.

Ultimately, the attempt to establish relativism or subjectivism as the final truth is self-defeating. It simultaneously denies the existence of universal truth while asserting universal claims about truth, morality, and human behaviour. In doing so, it abandons the very principles it seeks to defend. Rather than eliminating dogma, relativism merely replaces traditional doctrines with one of its own: the dogma that no one may claim objective truth—except, paradoxically, the relativist himself.